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MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
against as a result of his testimony before a Wisconsin circuit court
judge conducting a John Doe investigation may rely upon this case
in an attempt to invalidate the information. Assuming that the same
lack of consent is present when the witness is subpoenaed to appear
before a magistrate, as when he is taken before a grand jury in hand-
cuffs-the situation in Jones, a strong argument could be made for the
reversal of a resulting conviction on the ground that the information was
obtained in violation of his state constitutional privilege against self-
incrimination. A. WILLIAm FINKE
Torts: Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress as a Separate
Tort: Plaintiff sued for the recovery of damages incurred as a result
of defendant's conduct in completing a contract to replace the wooden
siding on plaintiff's home and to install combination aluminum windows
and doors. Defendant delayed work on the contract, exposed the occu-
pants of plaintiff's home to severe winter weather without adequate pro-
tection, and, through numerous personal contacts, intimidated, coerced,
and bullied the plaintiff. The plaintiff's damage consisted of severe
emotional distress brought on by a depressive reaction which left her
unable to function effectively in her home or at her job. The trial court
found defendant's conduct unreasonable, but refused to impose liability
on the ground that such conduct was not extreme and outrageous, and
of not sufficient flagrant character so as to be the basis for relief.
In Alsteen v. Gehl,' the court upheld the trial court's decision that
the defendant's conduct would not be considered outrageous and ex-
treme by the average member of the community. The court recognized
the existence of an independent tort which heretofore had not been
acknowledged in this jurisdiction:
One who by extreme and outrageous conduct intentionally
causes severe emotional distress to another is subject to liability
for such emotional distress and for bodily harm resulting from it.2
Four elements must be established before recovery is allowed:
1) The conduct must be intentional; that is, for the purpose of caus-
ing the plaintiff's emotional distress.
2) The conduct must be extreme and outrageous, characterizable by
the average member of the community as a complete denial of the
plaintiff's dignity as a person.
trict attorney shall, subpoena and examine other witnesses to ascertain
whether a crime has been committed and by whom committed. The extent
to which the magistrate may proceed in such examination is within his dis-
cretion. The examination may be adjourned and may be secret. If it appears
probable from the testimony given that a crime has been committed and
who committed it, the complaint shall be reduced to writing and signed and
verified; and thereupon a warrant shall issue for the arrest of the accused."
121 Wis. 2d 349, 124 N.W. 2d 312 (1963).
2 Id. at 358, 124 N.W. 2d at 317.
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3) The defendant's conduct must be the legal cause of plaintiff's
injury.
4) The plaintiff's injury must so disable him that he is not able to
function in his normal interpersonal relationships.
The Wisconsin court limited recovery to pure intentional acts, rather
than adhering to the Restatement of Torts' standard of liability3 which
allows recovery on a theory of constructive intent. This distinction
eliminates the possibility of recovery for mental distress where the
defendant "is not purposely attempting to impose psychological harm' 4
and is the one difference between the Wisconsin position and that of
the Restatement. Gross negligence has been abolished in Wisconsin and
a strict dichotomy established between the areas of negligent action and
intentional action. Therefore, reckless and grossly careless conduct will
not serve as a basis for an implied intent. "Willful and intentional torts,
of course still exist, but should not be confused with negligence."0'
By requiring the conduct of the defendant to be extreme and out-
rageous, the court has taken an additional measure to insure freedom
from fraudulent claims. 7 "If the conduct is gross and extreme it is more
probable that the plaintiff did, in fact, suffer the emotional distress
alleged."8 Whether or not the defendant's conduct will be considered
as a complete denial of plaintiff's personal dignity by the average mem-
ber of the community is the test that Alsteen has set upY
Courts have considered conduct extreme and outrageous in the fol-
lowing situations: persistent overtures for sexual intercourse,10 threat
to murder plaintiff's husband and the fulfillment of the threat," and
telling a mother that her child had been injured and was in the hos-
pital. 12 Cases where conduct has not been found to be extreme or out-
rageous are generally in the area of "bad manners." The underlying
principle that "some safety valve must be left through which irascible
tempers may blow off relatively harmless steam"1 3 has been zealously
guarded by the courts. No recovery was allowed where a person merely
had his feelings hurt,14 where the defendant invited a woman to illicit
s The Restatement includes the theory of constructive intent: "One who by
extreme and outrageous conduct intentionally or recklessly causes severe
emotional distress to another is subject to liability for such emotional dis-
tress and for bodily harm resulting from it." (Emphasis added.) RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND), TORTS § 46 at 22 (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1957).
4Alsteen v. Gehl, supra note 1, at 358, 124 N.W. 2d at 317.
Bielski v. Schulze, 16 Wis. 2d 1, 114 N.W. 2d 105 (1962).
r Id. at 18, 114 N.W. 2d at 113.
7 Magruder, Mental and Emotional Disturbances in the Law of Torts, 49 HARV.
L. REv. 1033, 1035 (1936).
8 Alsteen v. Gehl, supra note 1, at 360, 124 N.W. 2d at 318.9 Id. at 359, 124 N.W. 2d at 318.
10 Samms v. Eccles, 11 Utah 2d 289, 358 P. 2d 344 (1961).
2' Kniesin v. Izzo, 22 Il1. 2d 73, 174 N.E. 2d 157 (1961).
12 Savage v. Boies, 77 Ariz. 355, 272 P. 2d 349 (1954).
13 PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS, 45 (2d ed. 155).
14 Wallace v. Shoreham Hotel Corp., 49 A. 2d 81 (D.C. Munic. App. 1946).
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intercourse,"5 and where insults or indignities amounting to no more
than annoyances were endured by the plaintiff. 6
However, borderline cases continue to raise serious problems of
proof. In Curnett v. Wolf," the court allowed $4000 in damages where
plaintiff received pecuniary threats involving his employment in a long
distance telephone conversation. On the other hand, courts have refused
to allow recovery where a fifteen year old female was approached by
a man who made indecent proposals and gestures to her."' Another case
held that a female employee who was unjustly cursed in public and
then fired from her job could not recover in an action against her
employer.' 9
The third element, that of legal causation, has received extended
treatment in Wisconsin law-treatment that has culminated in the
"substantial factor" test cited in the case of Pfeiffer v. Standard Gate-
way Theatre, Inc.20 Pre-existing susceptibility"' to mental distress was
found to have no effect on the question of causation, except where the
defendant could show that plaintiff's injuries would have been present
in the absence of his conduct.
The severity of emotional distress suffered by the plaintiff is an
essential element in the cause of action. "The severity of the injury is
not only relevant to the amount of recovery, but is a necessary element
to any recovery."' Plaintiff must prove that his emotional distress is
extreme and disabling-one which affects him in his everyday life to
the extent that he is unable to function in his normal day to day rela-
tionships. Temporary discomfort has been eliminated as a basis for
recovery.23 This requirement provides an effective safeguard against
litigation by plaintiffs with mere injured feelings. Prosser notes that
there are few cases allowing recovery without proof of serious physical
illness resulting from the alleged emotional distress.2 4
Four arguments have been used in cases rejecting the imposition of
liability for pure mental distress2 5
'2 Reed v. Maley, 15 Ky. 816, 74 S.W. 1079 (1903).16 Beck v. Luers, Iowa, 126 N.W. 811 (Iowa 1910).
"7244 Iowa 683, 57 N.W. 2d 915 (1953).
18 Davis v. Richardson, 76 Ark. 348, 89 S.W. 318 (1905).
19 Atkinson v. Bibb Mfg. Co., 50 Ga. App. 434, 178 S.E. 537 (1935).
20262 Wis. 229, 55 N.W. 2d 29 (1952), wherein the "substantial factor" test
was defined as "such efficient cause of the accident as to lead the jurors, as
reasonable men and women, to conclude that the negligence of A ...was
a substantial factor in causing the injury." Osborne v. Montgomery, 203 Wis.
223, 234 N.W. 372 (1931). See also 55 Wis. L. REv. 36.
2"Alsteen v. Gehl, supra note 1, at 360, 124 N.W. 2d at 318. Cf. Colla v. Man-
della, 1 Wis. 2d 594, a case involving fright induced physical injuries, as con-
trasted with the present case where the plaintiff suffered from pre-existing
emotional problems.
22 Id., Alsteen v. Gehl.
23 Id. at 361, 124 N.W. 2d at 318.
24 PROSSER, op. cit. supra note 13, at 46.
25 Hamed v. E-Z Finance Co., 151 Tex. 641, 254 S.W. 2d 81 (1953). For other
cases summarizing these policy arguments, see Mitchell v. Rochester Ry. Co.,
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1) Mental anguish, standing alone, is too subtle and speculative to
be measured by any known legal standard.
2) Mental anguish and its consequences are so intangible and pe-
culiar and vary so much with the individual that they cannot reasonably
be anticipated, hence they fall without the boundaries of any reasonably
proximate causal connection with the act of the defendant.
3) A "wide door" would be opened, allowing recovery for fictitious
claims and also allowing litigation over trivialities and mere bad man-
ners as well.
4) Since mental anguish can exist only in the mind of the injured
party, no recovery should be allowed in the absence of some objective
injury.
In Alsteen,26 the court relied on the advances made in the sciences
dealing with mental health to rebut these policy arguments. Psychiatry
and clinical psychology are now able to provide sufficiently reliable
information enabling the jury to make intelligent, evaluative judgments
upon the validity and extent of the plaintiff's claim.2 7 This development
in medical science serves as a basis by which the legal causation of an
emotional injury can be determined. "While it may be true that at the
time the rule of no recovery was formulated, we lacked techniques for
gathering reliable information about psychological experience, we now
possess the tools whereby we can intelligently evaluate claims of emo-
tional injury."28
When faced with the argument that mental injuries were too eva-
nescent to be fairly compensable, the courts have been cognizant of the
fact that the law of torts has a recognized scope beyond the mere giving
of redress for injuries capable of exact or appropriate pecuniary meas-
urement.2 9 The majority of courts have frankly admitted the inade-
quacies of the four policy arguments in light of modem developments
in judicial proceedings-namely, the liberality of admitting expert testi-
mony, the accessibility of experts in the field of mental health, and the
recognition of the validity and trustworthiness of medical witnesses.30
As the New York Court of Appeals pointed out in Battalla v. State .3
In the difficult cases, we must look to the quality and genuine-
ness of proof, and rely to an extent on the contemporary sophisti-
cation of the medical profession and the ability of the court and
jury to weed out the dishonest claims.
151 N.Y. 107, 45 N.E. 354 (1896), overruled by Battalla v. State, 10 N.Y.
2d 237, 176 N.E. 2d 729 (1961).
26 AIsteen v. Gehl, supra note 1 ,at 359, 124 N.W. 2d at 317.
27 Ibid.
28 Ibid.
29 PROSSER, op. cit. supra note 13, at 39.
30 Smith, Relation of Emotions to Injury and Disease, Legal Liability For
Psychic Stimuli, 30 VA. L. Rzv. 193 (1944).3 1 Battalla v. State, 10 N.Y. 2d 237, 176 N.E. 2d 729 (1961).
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Dean Prosser's indignation at the objection that recognizing the inten-
tional infliction of mental distress as a separate tort would create a
"Pandora's box" adequately portrays the opposition the majority of
courts have given to each of the classic policy considerations. Prosser
pointed out that
it is the business of the law to remedy wrongs that deserve it,
even at the expense of a 'flood of litigation,' and it is a pitiful
confession of incompetence on the part of any court of justice
to deny relief on such grounds.'1
Recognition of the intentional infliction of severe emotional distress
as a separate tort is a great stride in the modern development of the
law. The legal profession has recognized the developments, both in
medical science and the law, and relied thereon in extending the mantle
of protection to an individual's right to enjoy peace of mind without
intentional invasion. Whether this step marks but the midpoint in the
eventual movement to allow recovery for mental distress resulting from
negligent action has yet to be finally resolved.
FRANCIS J. PODVIN
Torts: Trial Court Difficulties in Applying the New Rule of
Fair Mistake to Civil Libel: Defamation, comprising libel and slan-
der, is one of the most complex areas of the law, replete with distinc-
tions and qualifications.' The United States Supreme Court has recently
added to the already existing constitutional restrictions by holding that
the first amendment through the fourteenth "delimits a State's power
to award damages for libel in actions brought by public officials against
critics of their official conduct,"' (emphasis added) unless actual nalice
is shown. Before discussing the significance of this decision, it is neces-
sary to review briefly the traditional law in this area.
Defamation involves the communication to others of matter which
tends to lessen the goodwill, respect, esteem, or confidence in which a
person is held or to encourage derogatory, adverse, or unpleasant feel-
ings or opinions about him.3 Originally, libel was defined as written
defamation. This definition is no longer accurate. Libel, today, consists
in the embodiment of defamation in some seemingly permanent physical
32 PROSSER, op. cit. supra note 13, at 39. See also Kniesin v. Izzo, 22 IIl. 2d 73,
174 N.E. 2d 157 at 165: "Consequently, we must agree with those jurists and
critics who find that the reasons advanced in the cases for denying an action
for the intentional infliction of severe emotional distress have for the most
part been added to support a predetermined conclusion dictated by history
and the fear of extending liability..."
'WINFIELD, TORT 244 (5th ed. 1950) ; PROSSER, TORTS 572 (2d ed. 1955); 1
STREET, FouNDATioNs OF LEGAL LIAILITY 273 (1906).
2New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 84 S. Ct. 710, 727 (1964).
3 RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 559 (1938).
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